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The Suppressed Legacy 
of Nuremberg 
by Robert A. Burt 
The story of patient self-determination cannot be told with- 
out the Nuremberg trials. Patient autonomy was the first 
criterion enunciated by the Nuremberg judges and has served 
as a touchstone for human subject research and patient care 
ever since. Yet this ideal was in an important sense irrelevant 
at the moment it was originally proclaimed. 
uremberg has a special 
resonance in the annals of 
law and biomedical ethics. 
Though it was not the first 
jurisprudential appearance for the 
principle of patient autonomy, the 
Nuremberg judgment gave central 
importance to this principle as an 
ideal that should govern physician- 
patient relations. When we retell the 
history of this relationship today- 
its evolution from "doctor knows best" 
to "patient self-determination"-hon- 
orific citation to Nuremberg is a 
conventional starting point in the 
narrative. 
Depending on the narrator, there 
are two typical variations of the story. 
Most frequently, the plotline is a pro- 
gression onward and upward for the 
application of the Nuremberg auton- 
omy ideal: from research subjects to 
all patients, from the right to "in- 
formed choice" about extraordinary 
therapies to the right to refuse "ordi- 
nary" life-prolonging interventions 
such as tube feeding or antibiotics, 
from the right to refuse treatment to 
the right to obtain physician assis- 
tance in suicide.' In other, less com- 
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mon, recountings, the plotline puts 
Nuremberg at a pinnacle followed by 
decline; in this version, the vision of 
patient autonomy held aloft by the 
Nuremberg judges has subsequently 
been given lip-service but never fully 
honored in practice.2 In either vari- 
ation, the story has a triumphalist im- 
plication-a moral victory was won at 
Nuremberg and that victory serves as 
a beacon (or as a righteous rebuke) 
for us today. 
Like many oft-told family stories, 
however, this narrative has a darker 
side that the constant retelling ob- 
scures and yet, at the same time, para- 
doxically keeps alive by the simple 
fact of its repetition. The self-determi- 
nation ideal is, of course, much cele- 
brated in our political tradition; it was 
the guiding ideal in this country for 
our War of Independence from Great 
Britain. Since that foundational mo- 
ment, the ambit of this ideal has been 
a continuously contested proposition. 
The terms of this contest have had 
the same recurrent theme: that some 
social relationships are outside the 
self-determination ideal and are more 
properly (or even more "naturally") 
depicted as based on dependency 
and correlative inequality between 
caretaker and ward. This was the ar- 
gument advanced in the nineteenth 
century by men of property regarding 
landless laboring men, by white slave- 
holders regarding black slaves, by 
men regarding women, by physicians 
regarding patients. The case for de- 
pendency and inherent inequality 
has, however, been a losing battle: the 
dominant narrative in our intellectual 
history has been the progressive 
spread of the self-determination ideal 
as the sole legitimate depiction of all 
these social relationships (however 
haltingly or imperfectly that ideal has 
been implemented in practice). 
The application of the ideal to phy- 
sician-patient relations is the most re- 
cent in this progression but it hardly 
seems surprising; and its invocation in 
the 1947 doctors' trial at Nuremberg 
is even less surprising in light of the 
fact that all of the judges in this pro- 
ceeding were Americans, whereas the 
judges in the immediately preceding 
Nuremberg trials of high Nazi offi- 
cials and German military officers 
were drawn from all of the Allied na- 
tions. There is, nonetheless, one sur- 
prising aspect to the conjuring of the 
self-determination ideal in the Nur- 
emberg doctors' trial that seems, on 
close inspection, to raise some discon- 
certing questions about the legitimacy 
of its application there. 
Consider the foundational example 
of the self-determination ideal in the 
American Revolution. In that con- 
text, the proponents of the ideal un- 
derstood that if they had consented 
to the measures imposed by Great 
Britain regarding taxation or other 
matters, their consent in itself would 
have validated the British actions. At 
Nuremberg, however, it was clear that 
the consent of the experimental sub- 
jects would not have justified the ex- 
periments. The ideal of patient self- 
determination whose lineage is so 
proudly traced to Nuremberg was in 
an important sense irrelevant at the 
very moment that it was originally 
proclaimed. This is an odd beginning 
for a family history. 
Patient self-determination was the 
first criterion that the Nuremberg 
judges enunciated-that "the volun- 
tary consent of the human subject is 
absolutely essential"3-and this self- 
consciously awarded pride of place 
established the central role of the 
Nuremberg judgment in subsequent 
recitations of this ideal. But the 
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judges also invoked eight other crite- 
ria which, they said, "all [medical 
ethicists] agree ... must be observed" 
in human experimentation. Only two 
of these standards dealt with self-de- 
termination: the first, as quoted, and 
the ninth, which specified that the 
subject must remain free to discon- 
tinue the experiment at any time. 
The other eight criteria all depended, 
more or less explicitly, on the applica- 
tion of "reasonable professional judg- 
ment." The second, for example, pro- 
vided that "the experiment should be 
such as to yield fruitful results for the 
good of society, unprocurable by 
other methods . . . "; the sixth stated 
that "the degree of risk to be taken 
should never exceed that determined 
by the humanitarian importance of 
the problem to be solved ..... 
" 
The application of these standards 
faced a very different direction from 
the tribunal's initial insistence on pa- 
tient consent. We have become so ac- 
customed today to the norm of pa- 
tient consent that we easily miss the 
disturbing implications of the differ- 
ing perspectives between this norm 
and the other criteria in the Nurem- 
berg pantheon. At the moment that 
the Nuremberg tribunal promulgated 
these standards, however, the distur- 
bance-an undercurrent of loss and 
disillusion-was almost impossible to 
ignore. 
We might recapture this sense by 
imagining that we ourselves had been 
judges at Nuremberg and that, before 
writing the ten standards in our for- 
mal judgment, we had presided over 
the 133 days of testimony about the 
concentration camp experiments. 
During those 133 days, we would have 
heard about camp inmates placed in 
pressure chambers where the simu- 
lated altitude was increased until their 
lungs and other body organs explod- 
ed; we would have heard about in- 
mates plunged into ice water clothed 
in heavy military uniforms, or stripped 
naked and thrown outdoors in winter 
temperatures, where they remained 
(clothed or naked) until they had fro- 
zen to death; we would have heard 
about inmates purposefully burnt or 
cut by ground glass and left untreated 
until they died from the infection of 
their wounds; we would have heard 
about inmates whose healthy arms or 
legs were severed simply to test vari- 
ous surgical techniques for amputa- 
tions. 
After hearing all of this, during 
more than four months of testimony, 
imagine now that we adjourned to our 
conference room and talked among 
ourselves to arrive at a verdict. How 
plausible is it, in these discussions, 
that any of us would say: "The basic 
problem with these experiments is 
that the subjects did not agree to par- 
ticipate"? How truly important, or 
even relevant, was the question wheth- 
er any subject had consented before 
his lungs were exploded in a high al- 
titude chamber, before he was tossed 
into ice water until he froze to death, 
before he was burnt and left to die 
of infection, before his healthy arm 
was amputated to provide training ex- 
perience for the surgeon? To insist on 
the importance, or even the rele- 
vance, of consent in these matters is 
surely peculiar. But the Nuremberg 
tribunal judges did indulge in this al- 
most fantastic imagining. How could 
they have come to this? After hearing 
about these barbaric experiments for 
133 days, how could they begin their 
judgment by proclaiming that their 
primary standard of moral evaluation 
was: "The voluntary consent of the hu- 
man subject is absolutely essential"? 
There is a plausible answer to this 
question, but it is a disturbing answer. 
This answer is that other imaginable 
criteria offered no comfort for the 
future. The fact was, as the 133 days 
of testimony clearly demonstrated, 
that these experiments had been ap- 
proved and carried out by recognized 
leaders of the German medical pro- 
fession, by holders of university chairs, 
by respected teachers and researchers 
of worldwide reputation. In the face 
of this social reality, other more ap- 
parently plausible condemnatory cri- 
teria-in particular, the criteria sub- 
sequently set out in the tribunal's 
judgment that good physicians never 
purposefully inflict death or disabling 
injury on anyone-lacked convincing 
effective force. 
Considerable effort was expended 
after the war, both inside and outside 
Germany, to claim that the physicians 
in the Nuremberg dock were not 
well-respected scientists and that the 
Nuremberg experiments were not 
"good science" or "real science." This 
effort cannot withstand critical scru- 
tiny.4 But the Nuremberg judges did 
not in any event pursue this chimera; 
they followed a different strategy. 
They did not put their trust in the 
existence of "civilized standards" 
among future professionals-neither 
in doctors who might consider wheth- 
er to perform experiments nor in 
government officials who might 
prospectively or retrospectively judge 
the propriety of those experiments. 
The Nuremberg judges established, 
as their first line of defense against 
recurrence of these barbarities, the 
individual subject-patient armed with 
the principle of self-determination. 
The implicit lesson that the Nurem- 
berg judges drew from the trial testi- 
mony was that they could not place 
principal reliance on the self-restrain- 
ing decency of traditional embodi- 
ments of social authority. This was the 
lesson taught not only by the doctors' 
trial but by the preceding war crimes 
trials of high government officials. 
The Nuremberg judges were led to 
their reliance on the protection of 
individual self-determination by the 
same route that had conveyed Thom- 
as Hobbes to this conclusion three 
centuries earlier. Sitting in Nurem- 
berg in 1947-surrounded by the 
physical wreckage of war and con- 
fronted by a human spiritual degra- 
dation beyond any previous experi- 
ence-the judges could readily have 
imagined themselves plunged into 
Hobbes's state of nature where no 
one could trust another for protec- 
tion or comfort; a time without social 
bonds, a "war of all against all" where 
everyone was at the mercy of others' 
unconstrained avarice and aggres- 
sion. As Hobbes had seen in the af- 
termath of the seventeenth-century 
English civil war, the only predictable 
source for human protection in such 
a world was each individual's solitary 
instinct for self-preservation. 
Hobbes also saw that perpetual war- 
fare, where each individual could rely 
only on himself, was an intolerable 
state for human affairs since life 
would necessarily be without valued 
meaning, would be "nasty, brutish 
and short." We need not endorse 
Hobbes's proposed solution, that each 
of us should enter a social contract 
surrendering personal authority to 
one absolute sovereign, to under- 
stand the powerful truth in his diag- 
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nosis that this endless sense of per- 
sonal vulnerability and consequent 
perpetual wariness in all human rela- 
tions is unbearable. But this unendur- 
able world is precisely what the judges 
at Nuremberg glimpsed-and then 
tried strenuously to avoid. 
ments hovers in the background of 
these cases in the image of predatory 
doctors subjecting vulnerable people 
to inhumane scientific procedures in 
order to benefit some dogmatic social 
policy unrelated to the individual wel- 
fare of their patient-subjects. 
If we look closely at contemporary American invoca- 
tions of the self-determination ideal in doctor-patient 
relations, we can see the same underlying sense of 
betrayal and helpless vulnerability that framed the 
Nuremberg judgment. 
If we look closely at contemporary 
American invocations of the self-de- 
termination ideal in doctor-patient re- 
lations, we can see the same underly- 
ing sense of betrayal and helpless vul- 
nerability that framed the Nuremberg 
judgment-and even implicit paral- 
lels with the German concentration 
camp experiments in the expressed 
fears that medical technology impris- 
ons and inflicts torture on many peo- 
ple. This nightmare vision was epito- 
mized in the first state court case to 
apply the self-determination ideal spe- 
cifically regarding the regulation of 
death in doctor-patient relations. In 
1976, the New Jersey Supreme Court 
invoked this principle to free Karen 
Ann Quinlan, a young woman in a 
persistent vegetative state, from the 
mechanical respirator that apparently 
was keeping her indefinitely but in- 
sensibly alive.5 The U.S. Supreme 
Court effectively endorsed this prece- 
dent in 1990, in a case like Quinlan 
involving an unconscious young wo- 
man.6 In separate opinions, two jus- 
tices testified to this same bad dream: 
"a seriously ill or dying patient whose 
wishes are not honored may feel a 
captive of the machinery required for 
life-sustaining measures" (Justice 
O'Connor) (p. 288); "the thought of 
an ignoble end, steeped in decay, is 
abhorrent" (Justice Brennan) (p. 
310). The shadow of the Nazi experi- 
In these cases, as in the Nuremberg 
judgment itself, the triumphalist reci- 
tation of the self-determination ideal 
masks several nagging background 
questions: How did these once-trusted 
caretakers become transformed into 
heartless predators? If they no longer 
can be trusted to protect vulnerable 
people, who can be trusted? Can I 
trust no one but myself when I am 
helplessly vulnerable? And, even more 
poignantly, is it enough to trust myself 
when I am helplessly vulnerable? To 
understand the self-determination 
ideal not as a transhistorical postulate 
but as the answer offered to these 
questions, questions that erupted ur- 
gently in a specific cultural and his- 
torical context, is to see the fragility 
and pathos that underlies our con- 
temporary invocation of the ideal of 
self-determination. 
This is our full connection with 
Nuremberg, a genealogy that is sup- 
pressed but nonetheless implicitly 
conveyed beneath the surface of our 
constant repetition of the triumphal- 
ist version of this family history. There 
is, however, a substantial cost to this 
mode of recollection, this unmen- 
tioned but nonetheless atmospheri- 
cally conveyed dark suspicion of weak- 
ness that underlies our protestations 
of confident strength. The most com- 
pelling contemporary expression of 
this suppressed recollection is in the 
arguments for a right to physician- 
assisted suicide. The proponents of 
this right base their claim on the prin- 
ciple of patient self-determination. 
But the invocation of this principle in 
this context carries the darker aspects 
of Nuremberg along with the text of 
the tribunal's judgment. Just as the 
Nuremberg citation to self-determina- 
tion did not resolve the issue before 
the tribunal, since the subjects' con- 
sent to the experiments would not 
have justified them, so too the self- 
determination principle is radically 
incomplete as a justification for phy- 
sician-assisted suicide. In both con- 
texts, the confident assertion of the 
self-determination right leaves unac- 
knowledged and unanswered a cru- 
cial background question: who can be 
trusted to care for me when I am too 
vulnerable and fearful to care for 
myself? 
The self-determination principle 
cannot answer this question since the 
question itself rests on the premise 
that the subject is too weak for effec- 
tive self-protection. In the context of 
physician-assisted suicide, this un- 
asked question arises in the gap be- 
tween the professed principle of self- 
determination and the demand for 
the assistance of another person, a 
professional caretaker, to carry out 
the subject's wishes. If self-determina- 
tion truly were the core value at issue 
in this demand, then the practicably 
available and legally recognized op- 
portunities for self-administered sui- 
cide would have an obvious relevance. 
For terminally ill, mentally competent 
people in particular-the group for 
whom the right is exclusively claimed 
in the current cases---existing law al- 
ready provides the option not only of 
refusing high-technology life-prolong- 
ing treatment but also food and water. 
And when a terminally ill, mentally 
competent person makes this choice, 
existing law does not bar physicians 
from providing palliative care which, 
well within current technological ca- 
pacity but without purposefully has- 
tening death, can effectively address 
any physical discomforts that might 
accompany this path toward death. 
The exercise of this option, which 
is fully justified by the internal logic 
of the self-determination principle, is 
not, however, enough for the current 
claimants. They want more than self- 
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determination. They want active assis- 
tance from physicians. They want ac- 
tive support from state officials in or- 
der to assure that physicians will care 
for them. They want a reassuring an- 
swer to the question that hovered be- 
hind the Nuremberg doctors' trial: 
whether physicians and/or state offi- 
cials can be trusted to protect rather 
than abuse vulnerable people. The 
principle of self-determination was 
invoked by the Nuremberg judges in 
effect to mask the fact that they could 
not provide any reassuring answer. 
The same principle is also invoked 
today, most notably though not ex- 
clusively in the claims for physician- 
assisted suicide, more as an expres- 
sion of mistrust toward physicians and 
the state than as a convincing refuta- 
ton of that mistrust. 
The staggering fact about our con- 
temporary comprehension of the 
Nazi era in Germany is that we still 
cannot understand how and why it 
happened-whether it reflects some 
deep fault line in German character, 
in modem technological societies, in 
human nature; whether it was a 
unique historical event produced by 
a combination of forces unlikely to 
come together again, or whether its 
preconditions are readily replicable; 
whether any possible repetition can 
be averted by self-consciously devised 
preventive measures and, if so, pre- 
cisely what those administrations 
might be. These large, terrible, unan- 
swered questions are the full legacy 
of the Nuremberg trials. We are walk- 
ing through these questions today in 
the specific context of claims for 
physician-assisted suicide. No wonder 
that a hasty conclusion, even a quick 
death, might appear preferable to an 
answer that we do not want to hear. 
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